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In a society where individuals diﬀer in their evaluation of diﬀerent social policies, when
might one consider a given individual as having preferences that are“extreme”relative to
the others’? And how important are such preferences in determining eventual policy?
In this paper, we describe an individual as being“extreme”if her views diﬀer from the
mainstream to the extent that the rest of the society is able to unanimously agree on a
compromise policy that they strictly prefer to what might have been the outcome if such
an individual has her own way.
Relying on the intermediate property of preferences due to Grandmont [1978] we pro-
vide a simple geometric characterization of “extreme preferences”. Furthermore, we also
present an illustrative positive model of lobbying activity where we apply our charac-
terization result to show that every equilibrium social policy is determined only by the
activities of those holding “extreme preferences” even when they are a minority.
Keywords: extremes, moderates, intermediate preferences, collective decisions
and lobbying.
1 Introduction
Consider a society of individuals who diﬀer in their ranking of various social policies. Which of
these individuals exhibit preferences that are extreme relative to others? And how important
are such preferences in determining eventual policy?
Referring to someone as having“extreme views”is of course common in everyday rhetoric.
An increasing number of formal works in economics and political science also use the labels
“extremes” or “moderates” in their work, particularly in relating the pattern of collective de-
cisions with individual characteristics. Banerjee and Somanathan [2001], Esteban and Ray
[2001], Osborne et al. [2000], Esteban and Ray [1999] and Lohmann [1993] are a few represen-
tative examples of this section of the literature. However, we are yet to come across any formal
treatment or discussion of what it means for an individual to have “extreme” preferences or
views.
1This paper studies environments involving collective decisions. We propose a simple and
intuitive deﬁnition of when an individual can be regraded as having“extreme preferences”and
characterize them in simple geometric terms. We also present an illustrative positive model
of collective decision making where any equilibrium social policy is determined only by such
individuals even if they constitute a minority.
In common parlance, one sense in which the word “extreme” is used is to express the
sentiment that the person(s) in question“holds views that diﬀer drastically and fundamentally
from those in the rest of the society”. It is this sense of the word that our formal deﬁnition
seeks to capture. The basic presumption here is that if someone were to so “diﬀer” from the
mainstream, the rest of the society should then be able to agree on a compromise policy that
they unanimously (and strictly) prefer to what might have been the outcome if an individual
with extreme views has her way.
To describe this formally, we view a society as consisting of a set of feasible social policies
X and a family of utility functions {u(·,t)}t∈T indexed by elements of a set T where each
member of the family ranks diﬀerent policies in X. Assume that for each type t in T, there
is a unique policy φ(t) in X which t ranks the highest among all other feasible policies. We
call φ(t) the favorite policy of t.
Deﬁnition (Extreme Types). Given a society (X,{u(·,t)}t∈T) the preferences correspond-
ing to a type t in T are said to be extreme (or that t is an extreme type) if there exists a
compromise policy x that is feasible and all other types in T strictly prefer x to φ(t). When
a type is not extreme, we say that it is moderate.
According to our deﬁnition, existence of a single compromise policy against a given type
is adequate for her to be called extreme even though it is possible that the preferences of
the diﬀerent types are the same except for their ideal policies. One may then argue that the
deviation from the views of others is not drastic. This however is not so. It will be evident
from our results that innocuous assumptions (such as the policy space be suﬃciently rich,
i.e. have a non-empty interior and continuity of preferences) will ensure that when a type is
extreme, there is an open set of policies each of which can be chosen as a compromise against
it. In this sense an extreme type according to our deﬁnition is also fundamentally diﬀerent
from the rest of the society.
A further salient feature of our deﬁnition is worth ﬂagging at the outset. Note that whether
a type is extreme or not depends only on the set of types T that are present in the society
and not on its distribution. It is thus entirely possible for a type to be extreme even when
the individuals of this type constitute a majority in the population. We do not consider this
to be a problem. Since our primary interest here is to specify an intrinsic property of the
diﬀerent “views” in terms of their relationship to each other – the information on who and
how many of them subscribe to this particular preference ordering seem to us of secondary
importance.
This approach of describing extremes independently of their distribution is also attrac-
tive in so far as it allows one to talk about extremes and moderates independently of the
collective decision making process that is being used by the society under consideration. The
characterization results of extreme types that we obtain can in fact be used to discuss which
collective decision schemes favor manipulation by extremes. The lobbying models presented
in Section 3 are a case in point.
2A preliminary observation that deserves emphasis is that our intuitive deﬁnition of ‘ex-
treme preferences’ certainly agrees with the informal use of the terms extremes and moderates
in the literature cited earlier. For, in these and several other spatial models of voting, the
preferences in the society are a ﬁnite family of single peaked preferences ordered on a line,
such as those considered by Black [1958]. In these environments, it is easy to see that the
types furthest to the left and to the right are the only extreme types according to our deﬁni-
tion1. Our results, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 generalize the above feature that an extreme
type cannot be expressed as a convex combination of the other types to higher dimensions.
We consider societies where X and T are subsets of some (possibly diﬀerent) Euclidean
space and the preferences satisfy the intermediate property of Grandmont [1978], a natural
extension of the linearly ordered single peaked preferences to higher dimensions. In Theorem 1,
we show that when there are ﬁnitely many types a type t ∈ T is extreme if and only if the
following hold: a). t is not a convex combination of the remaining types, b). φ(t) is not the
favorite policy of any type who is an average of the remaining types. This result of course
is consistent with the observation that the end points are the extreme types if types are
unidimensional as in the standard literature.
When the society consists of an inﬁnite family of preferences, then extreme types may
not exist. In Section 2.1 we consider a natural weakening of the deﬁnition of extreme types.
Theorem 2, an analogue of Theorem 1 then obtains.
The usefulness of our characterization result is explored in Section 3. There we study a
variant of a lobbying model that has been extensively studied in the literature on rent seeking
at least since Tullock [1980]. (See also the references listed in Esteban and Ray [1999]). We
show (Theorem 3) that economies with a large (but ﬁnite) number of individuals, in every
equilibrium, the individuals who actively lobby are necessarily of extreme type. Since we
do not make any assumptions on the distribution of types, the result also highlights the
importance of those with extreme views.
Also of independent interest is a corollary to Theorem 3 which shows that with unidimen-
sional type space, the only types that lobby are those at the two end points. In Esteban and
Ray [1999], the total amount of resources spent on lobbying activities is taken as a measure
of conﬂict in the society. One of their comparative statics results is that this societal conﬂict
is maximized when there are two groups whose members have extreme preferences. This
“twin peaks” equilibrium which maximizes conﬂict and polarization appear endogenously in
our model. This diﬀerence can be attributed to the fact that in our model, it is the individual
agent (and not the group) which chooses its level of lobbying activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the background and
contains the result for a ﬁnite family of preferences, namely Theorem 1. Generalization of
this result to inﬁnite family of preferences is done in Section 2.1. Finally, Section 3 contains
results on the lobbying model.
2 The Intermediate Property and Extreme Preferences
In the sequel (with the exception of Example 1), the set of policies X is a compact and convex
subset of Rk, the set of types T is a compact subset of R` and u : Rk × R` −→ R describes
1We discuss this case in detail in the next section
3the preferences. That is u(x,t) is the utility of policy x for a type t. Throughout, we assume
that for each t ∈ T, u(·,t) is continuous and strictly quasi-concave. This in particular implies
that φ(t) is well deﬁned. Let (X,T,u) denote a typical society.
In many models of conﬂict and spatial models of voting behavior, it is common to restrict
attention to societies where T,X ⊆ R` and u(x,t) = f(kx − tk) for a strictly decreasing
concave real valued function f(·). Then φ(t) is the element of X that is closest to t. As the
utility for any policy depends only on the Euclidean distance, we shall refer to such a society
as an Euclidean society of dimension `.
A somewhat diﬀerent environment that ﬁts our framework is the one studied by Banerjee
and Somanathan [2001] in their“model of voice”. In that model, the policy space is X = [0,1]
and there are two states 1 and 2. If a policy x is chosen, the vNM utility of each individual
is f(x) if state 1 occurs and f(1 − x) if state 2 occurs. Individuals however diﬀer in their
assessments of the likelihood, say t, of state 1. Each individual provides advice to a leader
who then makes a collective choice by choosing an element of X. The utility function of a
type t individual when policy x is chosen is then given by u(x,t) = tf(x) + (1 − t)f(1 − x)
where t ∈ T = [0,1]. When f(·) is concave, it is possible obtain φ(t) for every t. One can then
use our deﬁnition to determine which types t have ‘extreme’ beliefs. It is however important
to point out that much of our intuition for the characterization of extreme types is derived
from considering Euclidean societies.
For an arbitrary society with at most two types, each of them is trivially extreme. When
there are more than two types however, matters are more complicated. In fact, it is possible
to have societiesq where no type is extreme. As a simple example, consider the case where
X = {x1,x2,x3,x4} and T = {t1,t2,t3,t4}. The four diﬀerent strict rankings of these policies
corresponding to the diﬀerent types are shown Table 1.
t1 t2 t3 t4
x1 x2 x3 x4
x2 x1 x4 x3
x3 x4 x2 x1
x4 x3 x1 x2
Table 1: An example where no type is extreme.
Note that φ(ti) = xi for all i = 1,...,4. For t1 to be extreme, the only candidate for
a compromise policy against x1 is x2 since the former is ranked second under t2. However,
x1 is ranked above x2 according to t4 and this can not be the compromise policy either.
Consequently, t1 is not an extreme type. A similar reasoning establishes that no other types
are extreme. Thus all types are moderates.
In certain other cases however there is a simple characterization of extreme types. Take
for instance a unidimensional Euclidean society where X = R and T consists of ﬁnitely many
real numbers t1 < ... < tn. Further u(x,t) = −|x − t|. Here, the smallest type t1 clearly
represents an extreme type since the compromise policy t2 is ranked higher than φ(t1) = t1
by all types, (other than t1). Similarly, the largest type tn is also extreme since tn−1 is a
compromise policy among the other types. Moreover, no other types are extreme. A similar
characterization as above also holds for the “model of voice” referred to earlier.
4In fact, the implication that the end points correspond to extreme preferences holds more
generally. Consider a family of preferences such that whenever a pair of types t1,t2 rank x at
least as high as y, then type t3 which is a convex combination of t1 and t1, ranks x as high
as y as well. Given such a family of preferences, it is possible to equate the types with n real
numbers t1 < ··· < tn. It is not necessary to assume that the policy space is unidimensional
but assume that φ(ti) 6= φ(tj) if i 6= j. We now argue that t1 and tn are the only ‘extreme’
types. To see why this is true, consider the type t1 and let y = φ(t2) be the compromise policy.
We need to show that all types other than t1 rank y strictly above x = φ(t1). Suppose by way
of contradiction, that there is a type, say t, to the right of t2 according to which x = φ(t1) is
ranked at least as high as y = φ(t2). Since t1 ranks x above y and since t2 is in between t1
and t, the former must be ranked at least as high as the latter by t2, a contradiction to the
fact that y is the favorite policy of t2. An analogous argument establishes that tn is the only
other extreme type.
In a number of situations it may not be possible to order types on a line in the manner
described above, although it may be possible to order them in some other ways. For instance,
in a Euclidean society, depending on the location of the types, they can be ordered along each
coordinate keeping the other coordinates ﬁxed. The concept of intermediate preferences due
to Grandmont [1978] in fact allows a fairly general spatial ordering of preferences in higher
dimensions.
Formally, u(·,·) is said to possess the intermediate property2 if for any x,y ∈ Rk and
s,t ∈ R` and for all λ ∈ (0,1),
u(x,s) ≥ u(y,s) and u(x,t) ≥ u(y,t),
=⇒ u(x,λs + (1 − λ)t) ≥ u(y,λs + (1 − λ)t)
(1)
where the inequality in the consequent is strict if at least one of the inequalities in the
antecedent is also strict.
The utility function used in an Euclidean society satisﬁes the intermediate property.
Grandmont [1978] contains a procedure for generating a family of preferences satisfying the
intermediate property given a pair of utility functions. Caplin and Nalebuﬀ [1991] provide
particular examples of other families of utility functions that satisfy the intermediate property.
Grandmont [1978] itself demonstrates the powerful implications of the spatial ordering of
preferences, as described by the intermediate property, for the transitivity of the majority
rule and generalizations of the median voter theorems. Similar issues are pursued further in
Caplin and Nalebuﬀ [1991], Caplin and Nalebuﬀ [1988]. In a diﬀerent vein, Demange [1994]
employs similar restrictions on preferences to argue the existence of stable coalition structures
while Sprumont [1993] discusses the emergence of Rawlsian arbitration schemes.
Our interest in the intermediate property stems from the fact that it is a generalization of
the linear structure of unidimensional types to higher dimensions. Thus, it presents a natural
premise for an inquiry into whether such a society allows for a simple characterization of
extreme types? For instance, is it the case that a type is extreme if and only if it cannot be
expressed as a convex combination of the remaining types? After all this was the deﬁning
2The class of intermediate preferences studied by Grandmont [1978] is in fact more general than the de-
scription used here. Among other things, Grandmont [1978] allows for non-transitive preferences while we do
no.
5characteristic in the unidimensional case. The answer turns out to be in the negative as is
illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the two dimensional Euclidean society with types t1 = (0,0), t2 = (1,0)
and t3 = (0.5,0.5) and X is the line joining (0,0) and (0,1). Note that φ(t3) = (0.5,0) lies
on the line joining t1 and t2.
t1 = φ(t1) t2 = φ(t2) φ(t3)
t3
Figure 1: t3 is not an extreme type even if it is not a convex combination of t1 and t2.
In this example, no one type can be expressed as a convex combination of the other two
types. Yet t3 is not an extreme type since any x ∈ X to the left or to the right of φ(t3) makes
t2 and t1 respectively worse oﬀ. On the other hand, it is equally evident that t1 and t2 are
both extreme types.
The key feature that separates t3 from the remaining two types is that φ(t3) happens to
be the favorite policy of a type that is a convex combination of the remaining two types. As
we shall show below in Theorem 1, it is precisely this property which determines whether a
type is extreme or not.
First some notation. Given a compact subset P of some Euclidean space, let Con(P)
denote its convex hull. Recall that p ∈ P is an extreme point of Con(P) if it cannot be
expressed as a convex combination of the other elements of P. Let E∗(P) denote the set of
all extreme points of P.
Given a society (X,T,u), consider the following subset of E∗(T):
E(X,T,u) =

t ∈ R` :
t is an extreme point of Con(T) and
φ(s) 6= φ(t) for any s ∈ Con(T \ {t}).

(2)
Theorem 1. Let (X,T,u) be a society where X is convex and compact, T is ﬁnite, u(·,·) is
continuous and strictly concave in its ﬁrst argument. Moreover assume that u(·,·) satisﬁes
the intermediate property. Then a type is extreme if and only if it is an element of E(X,T,u).
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that E(X,T,u) can be a strict subset of E∗(T). In Example 1, t3 is not in E(X,T,u)
although it is in E∗(T). There are many interesting cases however when these two sets
coincide. For instance, E(X,T,u) = E∗(T) in Euclidean societies where T ⊆ X or in the
“model of voice” of Banerjee and Somanathan [2001]. For all such societies, the following is
immediate.
6Corollary 1.1. Let (X,T,u) be a society such that E(X,T,u) = E∗(T). Also assume that
the other hypotheses of Theorem 1 hold. Then a type is extreme if and only if it cannot be
expressed as a convex combination of the remaining types.
Proof. Immediate.
2.1 Inﬁnitely Many types
A critical assumption in Theorem 1 is that there are only ﬁnitely many types in the society. In
this section we shall brieﬂy describe how our results extend to societies with inﬁnitely many
types. A preliminary observation is that the deﬁnition of an extreme type is too strong and
rules out the existence of such types even in many intuitive situations. To see this reconsider
a unidimensional Euclidean society where X is the set of reals, u(x,t) = −|x − t| but now
the set of types is the entire interval [0,1]. In this environment it is reasonable to think of 0
and 1 as extreme types. However, there is no policy which makes every other type strictly
better oﬀ relative to the policy φ(0) = 0. Therefore 0 cannot be an extreme type. A similar
argument rules out 1 as being an extreme type.
For a deﬁnition that conforms with the intuition and is applicable at least in the more
common modelling practices, we settle for the following weakening of the notion of what it
means to be an extreme type.
Deﬁnition (Virtually Extreme Types). Given a society (X,T,u), a type t ∈ T is said to
be virtually extreme if it is extreme in every society (X,S,u), where S is a ﬁnite subset of T
and contains t.
That is, a type is virtually extreme among a family of preferences if it is an extreme type
in every ﬁnite sub-family that contains it.
Theorem 2. Let (X,T,u) be a society where X is convex and compact, T is compact u(·,·)
is continuous and strictly concave in its ﬁrst argument. Moreover assume that u(·,·) satisﬁes
the intermediate property. Then a type is virtually extreme if and only if it is an element of
E(X,T,u).
Proof. See Appendix.
2.2 Lotteries and Extreme preferences
In many situations, it is common to model the social decision as a lottery over a set of
sure policies. Allowing for randomization enlarges the set of potential compromises. Such
possibilities may allow a compromise against an otherwise moderate type and render her
extreme. Of course, introduction of lotteries will not have an eﬀect on a type that is already
considered extreme in their absence. What we now argue is that under the assumption of
the expected utility hypothesis, one can continue to apply Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 to the
set of sure policies by taking the utility function u(·,·) in those theorems to denote the vNM
utility functional and strengthen the assumption of quasi-concavity to concavity.
7To elaborate, suppose that the set of policies available to a society is ∆(X) which is the
set of lotteries over a set of pure policies X and u(x,t) is the vNM utility of type t. The





Assume that the hypotheses of Theorem 1 or Theorem 2 apply for the tuple (X,T,u)
except that u(·,t) is now strictly concave so that individuals are risk averse. By the Jensen’s
inequality, the favorite lottery of t ∈ T is in fact a sure outcome φ(t) ∈ X. Therefore if t is an
extreme type, there is a policy p(·) which all the types other than t strictly prefer to the policy
φ(t). However, note that due to concavity of u(·,s), the inequality V (p,s) ≤ u(Ep(x),s) must
hold for all s 6= t. Consequently, the sure outcome Ep(x) would also be a compromise policy
against t. In other words, if it is possible to ﬁnd a compromise against t when lotteries over
X are permitted, then it is also possible to do so even when lotteries are not available.
The applicability of Theorem 1 discussed above plays an important role in our analysis of
Section 3.
3 Active Lobbying and Extreme Preferences
In this section, we consider a simple model of rent seeking and discuss the pattern of lobbying
activity with regard to the characteristics of the agents preferences.
Consider a society (X,T,u) where T = {t1,...,tn} with Pi agents of type ti. The vNM
utility of an agent of type t ∈ T for a policy x ∈ X is u(x,t). We will assume that u(·,·) is
concave in both its arguments.
Players seek to inﬂuence the social choice in their favor by spending resources. Contribu-
tions are made simultaneously. Although a player may to contribute to more than one cause,
we avoid unnecessary mathematical complications by restricting contributions to only ﬁnitely
many policies. A player is however free to choose which ﬁnite subset of polices that she wishes
to contribute.
A strategy is then a function r : X −→ R+ with the property that r(x) > 0 for at most
ﬁnitely many x. Let ¯ r denote her total contribution from the strategy r(·). Given the choices
of the individual players, let the function R : X −→ R+ describe the aggregate contributions
so that R(x) is the total amount contributed by all the players for the policy x.
Given a strategy proﬁle, consider the set of policies which receive a positive contribution.
Denote this ﬁnite set by Q = {x1,...,xm} so that R(x) > 0 if and only if x ∈ Q. Note
that Q depends on the strategy proﬁle although we will not make this dependence explicit.




We capture the decision process as a lottery over X as follows. Given a strategy proﬁle,







if xi ∈ Q
0 otherwise
(3)
8unless of course R(x) ≡ 0. If R(x) ≡ 0, then policies are drawn according to a given arbitrary
but ﬁxed density on X.
Modelling the collective decision process as the above reduced form follows a vast literature
on public choice at least since Tullock [1980]. Other notable applications include Becker [1983]
and Grossman [1991]. Esteban and Ray [1999] contains a number of other references to works
that employ the above reduced form in varied applications.
Let g(ρ,t) be the opportunity cost of a type t player for committing an amount ρ toward
inﬂuencing activity. The payoﬀ of a player of type t who contributes according to r(·) while




u(xi,t)p(xi) − g(¯ r,t)
unless R(x) ≡ 0. If R(x) ≡ 0 then the payoﬀ is simply some constant.
The above completes a description of a game in strategic form, which in the sequel we
refer to as the lobbying game. Note that the lobbying game is identical to the model studied
in Esteban and Ray [1999] except in one critical respect. Here, each individual player is free
to choose how much she wants to contribute. In contrast, Esteban and Ray [1999] views
individuals as members of diﬀerent groups and the group as a whole chooses the contribution
for each member. Such a speciﬁcation glosses over issues of free-riding problems articulated3
in Olson [1965].
For the usual reasons, namely to ensure that the payoﬀ function is concave and to employ
calculus methods to determine the best response, we shall assume that for each t ∈ T, the cost
function g(·,t) is convex and twice diﬀerentiable. We shall use g0(·,t) to denote the partial
derivative of g(·,·) with respect to its ﬁrst argument – which is simply the marginal cost of
contributing resources for a type t player.
Observe that given the lobbying rules described by (3), if none of the players were to
contribute, then a typical player would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to contribute a small amount to
her favorite policy. For, such an action would ensure that her favorite policy is picked with
probability one and yields an inﬁnite marginal beneﬁt at the marginal cost of g0(0,t). Con-
sequently, in any equilibrium, one must necessarily have ¯ R > 0. This should be kept in mind
in the subsequent discussion since we routinely divide by ¯ R.
Proposition 1. A Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game exists. Moreover, in any Nash
equilibrium, a player either contributes a positive amount to her ideal policy or does not make
a contribution.
Proof. See Appendix.
In presenting our results below, we appeal to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.1. These results
do not (explicitly) involve lotteries, unlike in the present lobbying game. One must therefore
bear in mind the discussion in Section 2.2 in interpreting Theorem 3 and Corollary 3.1 below.
Theorem 3. Consider a society (X,T,u) that satisﬁes the hypotheses of Corollary 1.1, u(·,·)
is strictly concave and for each t ∈ T and u(φ(t),t) is a constant ¯ u. Also assume that g0(0,t)
3See Esteban and Ray [2001] however,
9is a positive constant c. Then there exists an integer M such that whenever the economy
consists of at least M agents of each type, any agent who makes a contribution must be an
extreme type.
Before we turn to the main arguments in the above proof, several remarks are in order.
First, when the marginal cost of contribution is a constant, the minimum number of
players of each type M in the theorem can be taken to be one. Second, it is important to note
that in equilibrium, there may exist some extreme types who remain inactive. The Theorem
only rules out moderates making positive contribution in equilibrium4. When the type space
is unidimensional, since it cannot be an equilibrium for only one type to make a contribution,
we have the following stronger result.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose T is unidimensional and all other hypotheses of Theorem 3 are
satisﬁed. If there are suﬃciently large number of players of each type, then in every equilibrium
exactly two types of players engage in lobbying activity. These are the players corresponding
to the two extreme types.
It is interesting to compare the above observation for unidimensional types with a result
in Esteban and Ray [1999] which shows that ‘conﬂict’ in the society (as measured by the
sum total of equilibrium contributions) is maximized when there are exactly two symmetric
groups. In their work, they do not allow for voluntary contributions but the lobby groups
choose the level of contribution for each player and study comparative statics exercises. In
this model, with the possibility of players making voluntary contributions, the above shows
that the bimodal outcome is the only equilibrium outcome in a large economy.
Third, the conclusion of Theorem 3 that only extreme types are active does not neces-
sarily extend to societies that satisfy only the hypotheses of Theorem 1 and but not that of
Corollary 1.1, as the following example shows.
Example 2. Consider a two dimensional Euclidean society where t1 = (−1,0), t2 = (2,0)
and t3 = (0.5,1) and X is the line segment joining (0,0) and (1,0). Here φ(t1) = (0,0),
φ(t2) = (1,0) and φ(t3) = (0.5,0). No type can be expressed as a convex combination of the
other two. Therefore, φ(t3) is however the favorite policy of type (0.5,0) which is a convex
combination of types t1 and t2, which means E(X,T,u) 6= E∗(T), Corollary 1.1 does not apply.
Theorem 1 however, can be applied to conclude that t3 is a moderate. Now note that ¯ u = 1
as each type is at a distance of 1 from X. Take g(ρ,t) = 0.25ρ so that all other hypotheses
of Theorem 3 are met. Then, using symmetry, it straightforward to support an equilibrium
where all three types contribute equal amounts5.
Finally, we note since the outcome of the lobbying game above is modelled as a lottery over
outcomes that receive positive contributions, the implication of Proposition 1 and Theorem 3
is that in equilibrium, it is only the ideal policies of the extreme types that are implemented.
One might argue that even though agents lobby for their ideal policies, the actual outcome
4It suﬃces to consider a two dimensional Euclidean society for an example of when this is true. Take X to
be the triangle with vertices x1 = (0,0), x2 = (1,0) and x3 = (0.5,) for a small positive  > 0. If we now take
T = {x1,x2,x3}, for  suﬃciently small, the type x3 cannot be active, even though it is an extreme type.
5Similar counter examples can be can be constructed to show that none of the other hypotheses in Theorem 3
is superﬂuous.
10instead of being a lottery is a compromise of these diﬀerent policy positions. In fact, Osborne
et al. [2000] study a model of collective decision making in committees where the compromise
rule is not a lottery but some “average” outcome.
One main conclusions are unaﬀected for certain modiﬁcations of the lobbying game so
that the eventual policy is taken to be such an“average policy”. Indeed, modify the lobbying





is chosen. As before, if R(x) ≡ 0, then policies are drawn according to a given arbitrary
density on X. Assume, as they do, that the utility of ¯ x to a type t is
V (r,t) = u(||¯ x − t||) − g(¯ r,t)
where g(¯ r,t) as before denotes the opportunity cost of committing an amount ¯ r toward inﬂu-
encing activity and u(·) is some concave function.
We shall refer to game implied by the above as the modiﬁed lobbying game.
The modiﬁed lobbying game is very similar to the one used by Osborne et al. [2000]. A
major diﬀerence is that in their model an individual can only choose whether to participate
in the committee. Here an individual has the possibility of expressing the intensity of her
preference by varying the amount of resources they spend on inﬂuencing the policy.
Following the methods used in the proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorem 3 the following
can be proved. We omit its proof.
Proposition 2. Consider a Euclidean society (X,T,u) where T ⊆ X. The modiﬁed lobbying
game admits an equilibrium. Moreover, there exists an integer M such that whenever the
economy consists of at least M agents of each type, any agent who contributes a positive
amount is necessarily an extreme type.
Proof of Theorem 3. We present here the arguments for the case when the marginal cost of
contributions is a constant, that is g(ρ,t) = cρ for all ρ ≥ 0 and for all t. The case of increasing
marginal costs and any other missing details can be found in the Appendix.
When the marginal cost is a constant, it suﬃces to take M = 1 so that the moderates
never contribute regardless of population sizes. From Proposition 1, in an equilibrium an
agent either contributes a positive amount to her favorite policy or not at all. Therefore the
aggregate contributions to diﬀerent policies can be represented by a vector R = (R1,...,Rn),
where Ri is the amount spent on policy φ(ti). In an equilibrium, ¯ R =
P
i Ri > 0 so that φ(ti)





i=1 pi[¯ u − u(φ(ti),t)] (4)
It turns out6 that mb(R,t) is the marginal beneﬁt of a player of type t from contributing to
her ideal policy in an equilibrium where R is the vector of aggregate contributions. Clearly,
6See the derivation of Eq. 8 in the Appendix and conclude (4)
11for R to constitute an equilibrium, this marginal beneﬁt must be no greater than the marginal
cost of making a contribution, which is to say that
mb(R,t) ≤ c ∀t ∈ T (5)
with the above being an equality whenever Rt > 0.
Since u(·,·) is strictly concave, mb(R,·) is strictly convex in its second argument. Therefore
the maxima of mb(R,·) occur only at exposed points of T. For all other types, (5) holds as a
strict inequality. Consequently if at all a type makes a contribution, then she is an exposed
point T. Applying Theorem 1 yields the result.
To prove the general case of increasing marginal costs, we ﬁrst show that an implication of
convex costs is that even if the population is very large, the total amount spent on lobbying
activity in any equilibrium is bounded. Therefore, for large enough population sizes, the
contribution of an individual player is close to zero. Then the relation (5) with c = g0(0,t)
must be approximately true. This is enough to repeat the arguments for the case of the
constant marginal cost the conclude that the above cannot hold as an equality for a moderate
type. Missing details can be found in the formal proof in the Appendix.
A Proofs of Results in Section 2
Proof of Theorem 1. Our arguments involve extensive use of Proposition Section 3, Grand-
mont [1978] which we state below as Result 1 (in a form convenient for our analysis).
Result 1 (Grandmont [1978]). Suppose u(·,·) satisﬁes the intermediate property. Then
for each x 6= y, x,y ∈ X, there exists a unique hyperplane H(x,y) ⊆ R` such that the types
that strictly prefer x to y lie above H(x,y), the types that are indiﬀerent to x and y lie on
H(x,y) while the remaining types lie below H(x,y).
Suppose t is an extreme type and let x be a compromise policy against t. Then by Result 1
every type in T other than t lies below the hyperplane H(φ(t),x) while t lies above it. This
implies two things. First t is an extreme point of T. Second, Con(T\{t}) lies below H(φ(t),x).
Therefore any type s ∈ Con(T \ {t}) also prefers x to φ(t), which in turn means φ(s) 6= φ(t).
Now for each s ∈ T \ {t}, let γ(s) = (1 − )s + t and let K = Con{γ(s) : s ∈ T \ {t}}.
We will exhibit a policy x such that for a suitably chosen positive , every type in K weakly
prefers x to φ(t), so that K lies on or below the hyperplane H(φ(t),x). Since t of course lies
above H(φ(t),x), by construction then T \ {t} lies strictly below H(φ(t),x) from which we
conclude that x is a compromise policy against t.
Choose any s ∈ Con(T \{t}). Since φ(s) 6= φ(t), by the intermediate property, there exists
a (unique) type s0, which strictly in between s and t on the line joining them such that all the
types between s and s0 strictly prefer φ(s) to φ(t). This in particular implies that φ(t) is not
the favorite policy of any of these types. Consequently, we can choose an  suﬃciently small
but positive so that
φ(s) 6= φ(t) ∀s ∈ K. (6)
It remains to exhibit a policy x which the types in K unanimously weakly prefer to φ(t).
Using (6), we do this below.
12Let K∗ = {s1,...,sm} denote the extreme points of K. For i = 1,...,m, let Fi = {s ∈
K : u(φ(s,si) ≥ u(φ(s),si)}. In words, Fi is the set of types whose favorite policies type si
weakly prefers φ(t). Now suppose S ⊆ K∗ and s ∈ Con(S). If u(φ(s),si) ≤ u(φ(t),si) for all
si ∈ S, then by the intermediate property u(φ(s),s) ≤ u(φ(t),s) in violation of (6). Therefore
there exists si ∈ S such that s ∈ Fi. Since S was chosen to be an arbitrary subset of S, we
have just shown that
Con(S) ⊆ ∪si∈SFi ∀S ⊆ K∗
Noting that each Fi is closed, a direct application of the K.K.M Lemma7 shows that ∩si∈K∗Fi 6=
∅. For an x ∈ ∩si∈K∗Fi the set K∗ lies on or below H(φ(t),x) which in turn implies that K
must lie on or below this hyperplane.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose t ∈ E(X,T,u). Then clearly t ∈ E(X,S,u) for any ﬁnite S ⊆ T
that contains t. By Theorem 1, t is an extreme type in (X,S,u).
Conversely, suppose t is a virtually extreme type. If t is not an extreme point of Con(T),
by the Caratheodary Theorem, there exists ﬁnite subset S of T that does not contain t but
t ∈ Con(S). Therefore t is not an extreme point of Con(S ∪ {t}) and by Theorem 1, it is
not an extreme type of the society (X,S ∪{t},u). To complete the proof that t ∈ E(X,T,u),
repeat the arguments found in the“if”part of proof of Theorem 1 to conclude that φ(t) cannot
be the favorite policy of any type in Con(T \ {t}).
B Proofs of Results in Section 3
We begin by seeking equilibria in which all players of a given type contribute the same
amount and only to her favorite policy. A strategy proﬁle can then be described by a vector
r = (r1,...,rn) where ri is the contribution of a type ti player toward her ideal policy.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, a player either contributes to her favorite policy or not at




(ri,t) ∀ti ∈ T (7)
where mb(R,t) is as deﬁned in (4) and the above holds as equality provided ri > 0.
Proof. Let Q = {x1,...,xm} contain the subset of policies that receive a positive contribution
for a given strategy proﬁle and let R = (R1,...,Rm) be the corresponding vector of aggregate
contributions to these policies. Given R, and an arbitrary policy y, the expected beneﬁt of a
player of type t can be written as




Straightforward diﬀerentiation readily yields the marginal beneﬁt of contributing to an





pi[u(y,t) − u(xi,t)] (8)
7See Chapter 5, Border [1985] for example.
13which clearly achieves a unique maximum at y = φ(t). Consequently, a type t player must
only contribute to her favorite policy. The condition (7) is merely the necessary ﬁrst order
condition for ri to be a best response, which is also suﬃcient by virtue of the fact that the
payoﬀ function is concave.
Proof of Proposition 1. Pick any (β1,...,βn) such that βi > 0 and
Pn
i=1 βi = 1 and k > 0.
Now modify the lobbying game presented in the body of the paper as follows. First the
strategy of a player is restricted to making a contribution, if at all, to her favorite policy.





k + ¯ R
where ¯ R =
P
i Ri. At R, the expected utility of a player of type ti who has contributed an





i u(ti,t) − g(ρ,t)




i [¯ u − u(ti,t)] − g(ρ,t)
We will refer to the above game as the perturbed lobbying game where k is the size of the
perturbation. We will ﬁrst argue that this game admits an equilibrium and the show that an
appropriate limit of these equilibria as k → 0 constitutes an equilibrium of the original game.
The payoﬀ functions of the k-perturbed are strictly concave and unlike in the unperturbed
game, continuous. Through standard arguments, an equilibrium exists for the k-perturbed
game exists. It will be evident from the ﬁrst order conditions presented below that every
player of a given type contributes the same amount, provided g
00
(ρ,t) > 0. When g
00
(ρ,t) = 0,
the marginal cost of contribution is a constant and in this case there will be no loss in




i is the contribution of an agent of type ti adequately describes an
equilibrium. Let Rk = (Rk
1,...,Rk
n) denote the vector of aggregate contributions and ¯ Rk = P
i Rk
i . Diﬀerentiating U(·,t) with respect to the ﬁrst argument, the following ﬁrst order





j[¯ u − u(tj,ti)] ≤ g
0
(rk
i ,ti) ∀ti ∈ T (9)
where the above is an equality if rk
i > 0. Three useful properties of the equilibrium follow
from the ﬁrst order condition (9). First, we note that rk = 0 cannot constitute an equilibrium
when k is suﬃciently small. For if this where the case, the above LHS shows that the marginal
beneﬁt of a player of type t is
Pn
i=1 βi[¯ u−u(ti,t)]/k, which is positive. For k suﬃciently small,
this is higher than the marginal cost of making a small contribution, namely g
0
(0). From this
we can conclude that rk
i = 0 cannot be a best response and thus obtain a contradiction. In
the remainder of this proof, we restrict attention to such values k.
Second, {rk
i }k must be a bounded sequence for each ti ∈ T. For if this were not the case for
some ti, then the LHS of (9) would converge to zero while the RHS, due to the convexity gi(·),
would remain positive. Without loss of generality, we shall assume that limk→0 rk
i = r∗
i is well
14deﬁned for all ti. (Since {rk
i } is bounded, we could otherwise pick a suitable subsequence for
which this is true). Consequently, limk→0 Rk = R∗ is also well deﬁned.
Third, R∗ > 0. This must be true since (9) must hold as an equality for at least one player
for each k since ¯ Rk > 0. As there are only ﬁnitely many types, without loss of generality, there
exists a ti such that (9) holds as an equality along the entire sequence8. Putting together the
above three observations, and taking the appropriate limits with respect to k in (9) shows
that r∗ = (r∗
1,...,r∗
n) satisﬁes (7). The proof is complete on applying Lemma 1
Proof Of Theorem 3. Assume g00(ρ,t) > 0 as the case when g
0
(0,t) = 0 has already been
covered in the main body of the text. Assume, by way of contradiction that no much M
exist. Then there exists an inﬁnite sequence {Mk}∞
k=1 such that (a) limk−→∞ Mk = ∞ and
(b) for each k, there exists a conﬁguration of population sizes {Pi,k} such that Pi,k ≥ Mk and
an equilibrium rk = (rk
1,...,rk
n) in which at least one moderate type that is active. As there
are only ﬁnitely many types, it is possible to pick, one moderate type ti such that rk
i > 0 for
all k and mb(Rk,ti) = g
0
(rk
i ,t). Since g
0
(0,t) > 0, it follows from the above equality that the
sequence of aggregate contributions { ¯ Rk} is bounded, and hence, without loss of generality,
converges to say R∗. Since total contribution are bounded, it follows that limk→∞ rk
j = 0 for
all tj ∈ T. Consequently, we have
mb(R∗,tj) ≤ g0(0,tj) ∀tj ∈ T
with the above holding as an equality for the moderate type ti. Repeat the arguments provided
in the body of the paper in the case of constant marginal cost to arrive at a contradiction.
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